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Abstract 
This Article aims to demonstrate that the WTO jurisprudence on science-related trade 
disputes has become imbued with a specific vision of science that has prevented any possible 
application of the precautionary principle. This situation is due both to the WTO’s specific 
dispute settlement procedures and to the substantive nature of precautionary measures. Indeed, 
such measures’ foundation on “insufficient scientific evidence” dramatically undermines the 
probative value of science in WTO adjudication and creates a seeming contradiction: The 
system requires defendants to provide legal evidence of the absence of sufficient scientific evidence. 
The reasoning of the Panel on the EC–Biotech case was riddled with this apparent paradox. 
For the first time, the US–Continued Suspension case has opened a gateway to address 
this fundamental issue.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The precautionary principle is an established principle of international law 
that is explicitly included in a number of international environmental 
agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity1 and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,2 and is referred to in more 
general terms in other international agreements, such as the Marrakesh 
Agreement of 1994 establishing the World Trade Organization.3 
Notwithstanding the frequency with which it is invoked, there exists no 
universally accepted statement of the precautionary principle,4 nor is there 
consensus about its location within the sources of international law.5 Despite 
                                                 
1  Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), 33 ILM 818 (1992). 
2  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UN Treaty Ser 107, S Treaty 
Doc No 102-38 (1992). 
3  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol 1 (1994), 33 ILM 1125 (1994) (Final Act). 
4  See, for example, David L. Vanderzwaag, The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: 
Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces, 8 J Envir L & Practice 355, 360 (finding fourteen 
interpretations); Per Sandin, Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 Hum & Ecol Risk Assessment 
889, 902–05 (1999) (finding nineteen interpretations). 
5  In particular, most of the debate concerns its relevance as international customary law. For those 
who are in support of that thesis, see, for example, James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, The Status 
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this ambiguity, the precautionary principle is frequently invoked in treaties to 
ensure that, where there are threats of serious or irreversible damages to the 
environment, governments should take action even if scientific evidence of the 
risk is not conclusive. Indeed, the precautionary principle emerged from the 
concern that full scientific evidence is, for many issues of environmental law and 
policy, too strict a standard for undertaking action and that another form of 
rational justification should be found within the boundaries of science. For 
instance, instead of requiring that a risk be established in the form of probability 
before acting, its existence could be reflected upon plausible, reliable—even 
though not conclusive—explanations.6 Once it is established that policymakers 
should not forgo acting when the informing science is incomplete, it remains a 
matter of policy discretion to decide the form of the intervention, either through 
protective measures or through delaying the implementation of certain projects 
whose risks have not been clearly identified.7 
Including the precautionary principle in the WTO framework is highly 
controversial because of the discretion inherent in applying precautionary 
policies and the absence of definite standards of proof. Although Article XX of 
the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994)8 provides for 
protection measures, such measures’ adoption under the precautionary principle 
is problematic because they are based on reasons of “precaution” rather than of 
“strict necessity.”9 For measures premised on precaution rather than necessity, 
no clear standards of proof exist because the science underlying any application 
of the precautionary principle is, by its nature, incomplete or inconclusive. The 
precautionary principle exposes the tension between the political nature of the 
decisions concerning environmental policies and the need for a reasonable 
relation with the underlying scientific evidence. Furthermore, the precautionary 
principle affects each member state’s sovereign choice to set levels of protection 
for human, plant, and animal health. The second tension is thus between the 
need for interstate coordination, due to the global nature of environmental 
problems, and the sovereign right to act according to national preferences. 
Indeed, the lack of clear coordination benchmarks, such as scientific evidence 
                                                                                                                              
of the Precautionary Principle in International Law, in David Freestone and Ellen Hey, eds, The 
Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation 29, 36–37 (Kluwer Law 
International 1996); Theofanis Christoforou, The Precautionary Principle in European Community Law 
and Science, in Joel A. Tickner, ed, Precaution, Environmental Science, and Preventive Public Policy 241, 243 
(Island 2003). For the views of those who oppose it, see, for example, P.W. Birnie and A.E. 
Boyle, International Law and the Environment 116 (Oxford 2d ed 2002). 
6  Olivier Godard, et al, Traité des Nouveaux Risques: Précaution, Crise, Assurance 72–74 (Gallimard 
2002).  
7  See generally Nicholas de Sadeleer, ed, Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Approaches from the 
Nordic Countries, EU and USA  (Earthscan 2007). 
8  Final Act, Art XX (cited in note 3). 
9  For an explanation of the “necessary test,” see note 15. 
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would provide, and the discretion of policy intervention under precautionary 
considerations are certainly problematic for promoting harmonization among 
member states’ practices, which is one of the priorities at the WTO. Similarly, 
the use of protection measures that are politically discretionary and scientifically 
uncertain indicates that the precautionary principle may be used to disguise 
indirect barriers to trade. 
No explicit reference to the precautionary principle is found in the WTO 
agreement; rather there are “gateway” provisions to it,10 which have been 
interpreted through the WTO jurisprudence on science-related disputes to 
include the precautionary principle. However, I argue in this Article that despite 
some important changes, the status of the precautionary principle remains 
incompatible with WTO rules. This opinion is corroborated by one fundamental 
fact: Those states invoking the precautionary principle in support of protection 
policies have never succeeded in their claims.11  
This Article aims to outline an epistemological framework of science at the 
WTO in order to determine the proper application of the precautionary 
principle. This will be done by way of comparison with its supposed opposite, 
the science-based principle. In Section II, I provide a brief analysis of the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement12 (SPS Agreement) and the EC–Biotech 
dispute between the EU and the group composed of the US, Canada and 
Argentina. This analysis demonstrates that the precautionary principle is one 
                                                 
10  Ilona Cheyne, Gateways to the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law, 19 J Envir Law 155, 158 (2007). 
11  In the EC–Hormones case, the EC invoked the precautionary principle to justify its prohibition on 
marketing and importing meat and meat products treated with certain hormones. World Trade 
Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) ¶ 26, WTO Doc No WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan 16, 1998) (EC–
Hormones). The Appellate Body concluded that, among other provisions, the EC had violated 
Article 5.1 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, requiring that a member’s SPS 
measures be based on a risk assessment. Id at ¶ 253. In the EC–Biotech case, the EC invoked again 
the precautionary principle and the Panel concluded that the EC member state safeguard 
measures violated Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement because they were not based on risk 
assessments and hence could be presumed to be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. 
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, European Communities–Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products ¶¶ 4.290–4.291, WTO Doc No WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept 29, 2006) (EC–Biotech). Finally, in the US–Continued 
Suspension case, the EC invoked the precautionary principle to justify a temporary ban on meat and 
meat products treated with five specific growth promotion hormones. World Trade Organization, 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones 
Dispute ¶ 85, WTO Doc No WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct 16, 2008) (US–Continued Suspension). Though 
it did not fault the EC for its conduct, the Appellate Body was unable to determine whether the 
risk assessments performed by the EC supported a case of insufficient scientific evidence. Id at ¶¶ 
207–08. 
12  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol 1, Annex 2 A, 1867 UN Treaty Ser 493 (1995). 
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justification for imposing restrictive measures on trade. In Section III, I argue 
that despite being given the status of an autonomous right by the EC–Biotech 
Panel, the principle’s procedural and substantive qualifications make it operate in 
practice as an exception to the rule of performing a risk assessment. This precise 
allocation of the precautionary principle within the realm of policy as opposed to 
that of science creates a crucial legal problem, for which only scientific evidence 
is translated into legal evidence and only an “adequate” risk assessment is 
considered to be relevant for providing facts for the dispute. In Section IV, I 
address the situation in which a claim of precaution is severely impaired by 
“insufficient scientific evidence” or becomes even impossible to support when it 
has to counter a case of “sufficient scientific evidence.” In these situations, the 
question arises whether the precautionary principle can still refer to the 
autonomous right of WTO Members to set their preferred level of protection as 
found by the EC–Biotech Panel.13 In Section V, I address this seeming paradox 
through the analysis of another similar dispute, US–Continued Suspension. 
Analyzing this case opens the way for important changes to the epistemology of 
science maintained at the WTO. Section VI concludes. 
II.  THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PRECAUTION AT 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
A.  The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement  
In order to shed light on the discourse on the applicability of the 
precautionary principle in WTO law, this Article will focus on the WTO SPS 
Agreement, since it strictly addresses the relation between the validity of 
scientific instructions to protect human, plant, and animal health and the 
legitimacy of member states’ accordingly applying restrictive measures to trade. 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement states: 
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, 
is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.14  
Therefore, the SPS Agreement requires that all possible less-restrictive solutions 
be exhausted before imposing protective measures, a requirement called the 
“necessary test.”15 It further states that those actions producing more trade-
                                                 
13  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at ¶ 7.1389 (cited in note 11). 
14  SPS Agreement, Art 2.2 (cited in note 12). 
15  The “necessary test” was first formulated by the Panel Report on the Tuna/Dolphin case; in order 
to demonstrate that a trade-restrictive measure is consistent with Article XX(b) of GATT 1994, 
member states must have exhausted all possible less-restrictive alternatives, provided that the 
Panel determines whether any such alternative is “reasonably available.” GATT Dispute Panel 
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restrictive effects than those generally expected from similar measures based on 
international standards16 must be corroborated by scientific justification. 
As specified in Article 5.1, this justification implies that a risk assessment 
of the product under protection be performed: “Members shall ensure that their 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to 
the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking 
into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations.”17 
But the SPS Agreement also provides an exception to this rule, which is 
included in Article 5.7 and considers a situation where scientific evidence is 
insufficient to conclude that there is a definite risk: “In cases where relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including 
that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures applied by other Members.”18 Does this mean that a case 
arising under Article 5.7 is exempt from scientific justification? As I shall 
demonstrate in the following paragraphs, the WTO jurisprudence up until the 
EC–Biotech dispute confirms precisely this approach, validating a dramatic 
dichotomy between science in Article 5.1 and precaution in Article 5.7. This 
situation has important consequences for the ability to justify precautionary 
measures in case of dispute.19 
B.  The EC–Biotech  Dispute:  Legal Background 
In the EC–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
dispute (EC–Biotech),20 the group composed of the US, Canada, and Argentina 
accused the EU of having imposed a de facto moratorium on the 
commercialization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)21 since 1998 by 
                                                                                                                              
Report, US–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ¶ 5.22, DS21/R-BISD (39th Supp) 155 (Sept 3, 1991) 
(unadopted) (Tuna/Dolphin I).  
16  SPS Agreement, Art 3.3 (cited in note 12). In the Japan–Agricultural Products case, the Appellate 
Body stated that it would have been wrong to convert an advantage (the presumption of 
legitimacy for those SPS measures based on international standards) into an obligation that 
members comply with such standards. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, 
Japan–Measures Affecting Agricultural Products ¶ 102, WTO Doc No WT/DS76/AB/R (Mar 19, 
1999) (Japan–Agricultural Products). 
17  SPS Agreement, Art 5.1 (cited in note 12). 
18  Id at Art 2.2. 
19  See Section III. 
20  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech (cited in note 11). 
21  In this paper, biotechnology products are also referred to as “genetically modified organisms” 
(GMOs), except where differently stated. GMOs are products that have been altered using 
recombinant DNA technologies. 
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“undue delay” in the approval procedure.22 Besides accusation of procedural 
failures,23 the complainants claimed that the European member states either 
never performed the risk assessments on GMOs or dismissed the positive 
results of risk assessments.24 Thus, according to the complainants, the European 
behavior violated Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, which requires that SPS 
measures be based on scientific risk assessment.25 In the absence of such an 
assessment, the European delay amounted to a non-necessary26 and not science-
based27 restrictive measure to trade.28 
In their defense, the European Communities (EC) argued that, to the 
extent that safeguard measures29 on the import of certain GMOs were adopted 
by six EC member states,30 the case of inconsistency was to be examined under 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement instead of Article 5.1, the former 
contemplating the case of insufficient scientific evidence and better reflecting 
the precautionary principle.31 
On September 29, 2006, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body issued its 
ruling on the complaints, on the one hand faulting the EC for “undue delay” in 
approving GMO products for a four-year period ending in 200332 and on the 
other accusing a number of EC member states of maintaining unjustified bans 
on genetically modified products already found safe by the European scientific 
committees.33 Indeed, the justification of the six European states that scientific 
results were not “convincing” and needed further evaluation before allowing the 
                                                 
22  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at ¶ 4.163 (cited in note 11). 
23  The complainants accused the EU on two grounds: a general complaint related to the its 
incapacity to consider or complete the approval of certain GMOs under Community legislation; 
and a specific and more substantial complaint related to the obligation to provide scientific 
justification for maintaining the alleged ban. 
24  Id at ¶¶ 4.2204.221. 
25  Id at ¶ 4.222. 
26  SPS Agreement, Art 5.6 (cited in note 12) (defining “non-necessary” as “more trade restrictive 
than required”). 
27  Id at Art 2.2 (defining “not science-based” as “maintained without sufficient scientific evidence”). 
28  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at 1068 (cited in note 11). 
29  Safeguard measures are trade-restrictive measures for the sale or use of GMOs that EC member 
states may adopt on a provisional basis, even if those products have already received consent for 
introduction into the European market. At the time of the dispute, the safeguard was laid down in 
Council Directive 90/220, Art 16 1990 OJ (L117) 15, 20, and Commission Regulation 258/97, 
Art 12, 1997 OJ (L 043) 1, 6. 
30  The six European states concerned are Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and 
Luxembourg. 
31  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at ¶ 4.467 (cited in note 11). 
32  Id at 1068 (stating that the suspension of the approval procedure produced a de facto general 
moratorium inconsistent with the provisions of Article 8 and Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement). 
33  Id at ¶ 4.602. 
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import of these products was not upheld by the Panel, which found no GMO 
case where scientific evidence was insufficient to perform an adequate risk 
assessment.34 
C. The Role of Article 5 .7 with Respect to Article 5.1 of the 
SPS Agreement 
Despite the fact that the Panel managed to bypass substantial questions on 
the compatibility between European legislation on GMOs and WTO rules35 and 
finally concluded by faulting the EC only on the procedural ground of “undue 
delay,” some important issues of a substantive nature emerged at a variety of 
levels. The first substantive issue is the tension between a state’s sovereign right 
to apply the level of protection it deems appropriate for its citizens on the one 
hand and the need to harmonize state practices by means of some neutral 
standard—science being the presumptive candidate—on the other. The second 
issue concerns the boundary between science and non-science, or “pertinent 
available information” under Article 5.7. The third and most important issue 
raised by EC–Biotech concerns the probative value of all pertinent information 
with respect to science. 
To address these questions, we should begin by understanding why and 
how the EU invoked the precautionary principle in claiming that scientific 
evidence was insufficient. After all, some risk assessments had already been 
performed on certain GMOs and had concluded in favor of their safety. The 
complainants argued that since the EC’s measures amounted to a ban, and since 
there was no reason for concern about these products, the EC’s conduct was not 
rationally or objectively based on risk assessment, contrary to Article 5.1.36  
The European legislation on GMOs contains the so-called “safeguard 
clause,”37 which integrates the precautionary principle by allowing European 
states to derogate from the Commission’s final approval of GMOs. Under the 
safeguard clause, member states may provisionally restrict GMOs’ sale and use 
even after the Commission allows the introduction of certain GMOs into the 
European market. The European safeguard clause is compatible with the SPS 
Agreement for two reasons. As determined by the Appellate Body in the EC–
Hormones case, Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement confers upon WTO member 
states the right to choose their own level of protection, including a higher level 
                                                 
34  See generally id. 
35  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at 1067 (cited in note 11). 
36  The requirement that SPS measures be “based on” risk assessment has been interpreted in other 
cases by the Appellate Body to be a substantive requirement that there be a rational or objective 
relationship between SPS measures and risk assessment. See Report of the Panel, EC–Hormones at 
¶ 186 (cited in note 11); Report of the Appellate Body, Japan–Agricultural Products at ¶ 84 (cited in 
note 16). 
37  Council Directive 90/220, Art 16 (cited in note 29). 
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of protection than that established by international standards.38 Furthermore, 
Article 5.7 of the same agreement considers that “in cases where relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures.”39 But can Articles 3.3 and 5.7 override the requirement 
set out in Article 5.1 to base SPS measures on risk assessment? 
An extensive part of the proceedings in EC-Biotech was devoted to precisely 
this point. Its discussion was undertaken as a matter of legal procedure. The 
issue was whether the complainants had to make their prima facie case on the 
basis of Article 5.1, as they themselves requested, or on the basis of Article 5.7, 
which was instead invoked by the EC. Since both are considered justification for 
protection measures under Article 2.2,40 the EC called for a parallel: Inasmuch as 
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement granted member states the autonomous right 
to set their chosen standards of protection,
41
 it was an autonomous right—and 
not an exception—for each member state to take precautionary actions under 
Article 5.7. According to this view, Article 5.7 gave precautionary actions the 
same legitimacy as Article 5.1 gave risk-based actions. As a matter of legal 
procedure, this would have implied that the complainants present their prima 
facie case of inconsistency on the basis of Article 5.7.  
The Panel agreed with the EC’s position and held: 
[I]f a challenged SPS measure was adopted and is maintained consistently 
with the four cumulative requirements of Article 5.7, the obligation in 
Article 5.1 to base SPS measures on a risk assessment is not applicable to the 
challenged measure. Conversely, if a challenged SPS measure is not 
consistent with one of the four requirements of Article 5.7, the 
aforementioned obligation in Article 5.1 is applicable to that measure, 
provided there are no other elements which render Article 5.1 
inapplicable.42  
This interpretation set an important precedent for the precautionary principle 
within the WTO legal framework, conferring upon it the status of an autonomous 
right. Concerning the EC–Biotech case, this interpretation blessed the EC’s 
invocation of the precautionary principle under Article 5.7, in spite of the 
conclusions of risk assessments. It therefore fell to the complainants to prove 
that there was not “insufficient scientific evidence” in this case and, once they 
                                                 
38  In the EC–Hormones case, the Appellate Body reversed the previous Panel finding on the same 
case that setting higher standards of protection represented an exception to the general objective 
of the SPS Agreement to promote international standards harmonization: “[The] right of a 
Member to establish its own level of sanitary protection under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is 
an autonomous right and not an ‘exception’ from a ‘general obligation’ under Article 3.1.” Report of 
the Appellate Body, EC–Hormones at ¶ 172 (cited in note 11). 
39  SPS Agreement, Art 5.7 (cited in note 12) (emphasis added). 
40  See Section II.A. 
41  Report of the Appellate Body, EC–Hormones at ¶ 172 (cited in note 11). 
42  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at ¶ 7.2997 (cited in note 11) (emphasis added). 
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had discharged the burden of proof, it would have fallen to the EC to provide 
evidence for its claim of “insufficient scientific evidence.” 
But proceedings did not ultimately go this way. The EC–Biotech Panel failed 
to follow the logical implications of its own findings and decided to review the 
prima facie case of the complainant under Article 5.1.43 This choice was 
explained as a matter of legal procedure: Since the two articles applied to 
exclusive situations (one of sufficient and the other of insufficient scientific 
evidence), if the European safeguard measures had been found consistent with 
Article 5.1, the Panel held, there would have been no need to assess their 
consistency with Article 5.7.44 However, precisely because of this exclusivity 
between Articles 5.1 and 5.7, the opposite reasoning would have been equally 
valid: If the safeguard measures had been found consistent with Article 5.7, then 
there would have been no need to analyze further their consistency with Article 
5.1. 
What then is the real difference between the two legal procedures? I shall 
explain that, in practical terms, given the vision of mainstream science 
maintained by the Panel and confirmed by previous WTO jurisprudence on 
similar cases, the difference is negligible.45 Theoretically, if the WTO’s vision of 
mainstream science changed, the difference between adjudication under Article 
5.1 and under Article 5.7 could be substantial.46 
III.  LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PROOF 
The EC–Biotech Panel concluded that Articles 5.1 and 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement applied to two mutually exclusive situations: cases with sufficient 
scientific evidence and cases with insufficient scientific evidence.47 The mutual 
exclusivity of the two articles implies that, in theory, cases under either article 
should have equivalent legal procedures. However, the EC–Biotech Panel upheld 
the definition of Article 5.7 as “a qualified exemption from the obligation under 
Article 2.2 not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific 
evidence.”48 This description of Article 5.7 suggests that, in practice, cases under 
the two different articles might not receive equal treatment. Indeed, in terms of 
the relative probative values of science and precaution, science, corroborated by 
                                                 
43  Id at ¶ 4.620. 
44  Id at ¶ 7.3006. This choice was explained as a matter of legal procedure. In fact, the Panel held 
that if the safeguard measures had been found consistent with Article 5.1, there would have been 
no need to assess their consistency with Article 5.7, given their exclusivity; that is, neither article 
takes precedence over the other.  
45  See Section III.B. 
46  See Section V.B. 
47  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at ¶ 7.3006 (cited in note 11). 
48  Report of the Appellate Body, Japan–Agricultural Products at ¶ 80 (cited in note 16). 
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a risk assessment in the form of “sufficient scientific evidence,” certainly has an 
advantage over precaution, marked by “insufficient scientific evidence.” After 
all, what is more “evident” than science?  
To answer this question, we should first distinguish precaution 
(“insufficient scientific evidence”) from science (“sufficient scientific evidence”), 
before identifying the consequences this distinction has on the relation between 
scientific evidence and legal evidence.  
To begin with, the wording of Article 2.2 rephrases the essence of the two 
realms denoted by Articles 5.1 and 5.7 as “scientific principles” on the one hand 
and “available pertinent information” on the other.49 This rephrasing deprives 
the notion of “insufficient scientific evidence” of its scientific and evident nature, 
creating a problem that is both scientific50 and legal.51 
A.  The Relationship between Sufficient Scientif ic Evidence 
and Adequate Risk Assessment  
The wording of the SPS Agreement conveys the idea that only scientific 
evidence that is “sufficient” remains scientific, whereas scientific evidence that is 
insufficient loses its scientific character and becomes “available pertinent 
information.” 
But what makes scientific evidence insufficient? According to the Appellate 
Body Report in Japan–Apples,52 which the EC–Biotech Panel followed, “‘relevant 
scientific evidence’ will be ‘insufficient’ within the meaning of Article 5.7 if the 
body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative 
terms, the performance of an adequate risk assessment.”53   
In the EC–Biotech case, assessments of the risk entailed by certain GMOs 
were already available, therefore providing “sufficient scientific evidence.”54 But 
we know that the EC actually claimed to have “insufficient scientific evidence” 
despite the availability of those risk assessments.55 If the ability to perform an 
“adequate risk assessment” is the bright line between the two situations,56 how 
could the EC invoke the precautionary principle? In terms of legal procedure, 
we already know the answer;57 but in terms of legal substance, this creates a true 
                                                 
49  See Section II. 
50  See Section III.A. 
51  See Section III.B. 
52  World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan–Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples ¶ 179, WTO Doc No WT/DS245/AB/R (Dec 10, 2003) (Japan–Apples). 
53  Id at ¶ 179. 
54  Report of the Panel, EC–Biotech at ¶ 4.216 (cited in note 11). 
55  Id at ¶ 4.379. 
56  Id at ¶ 7.2939. 
57  See Section II.C. 
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problem, whose origins are to be found in the epistemology of science 
maintained by the Panel. 
According to the Panel’s view, an “adequate risk assessment” is one that 
follows the standards contained in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement and is able 
to demonstrate the existence of a risk in terms of the probability, and not just 
possibility,58 that an event may induce another event.59 Going back to the 
definition of insufficient scientific evidence as one where “the body of available 
scientific evidence does not allow . . . the performance of an adequate risk 
assessment,”60 the correspondence between the “adequacy” of risk assessment 
and the “sufficiency” of scientific evidence can be summarized through the 
following syllogism: Risk assessment is adequate when it builds on the Annex 
A(4) standards; to follow Annex A(4) standards implies that scientific evidence is 
sufficient; therefore, an adequate risk assessment is one where scientific evidence is 
sufficient. 
The epistemological problem with this interpretation is that the transitivity 
between the adequacy of risk assessment and the sufficiency of scientific 
evidence is incorrect: Risk assessment is certainly the defining feature of 
“science,” but it does not provide any guarantee of producing sufficient 
scientific evidence. Indeed, it is a matter of ontological and epistemological 
correctness to distinguish between the information that is processed in a risk 
assessment (input) and the conclusions that can result from it (output). As with 
any decision, the evidence is not produced by facts (the collection of sufficient 
data), but by the moment when knowledge is closed.
61
 When this does not 
happen, for example when a cause-effect relationship between two events 
cannot be established, knowledge remains open to alternative possible 
conclusions, which in any case are the product of a scientific analysis. This 
means that sufficient scientific evidence is not the inevitable product of 
processing all the information relevant and available to a subject, but is the 
product of interpretation. Most importantly, scientific evidence does not lose its 
scientific character if it is inconclusive as to the existence of a risk.  
                                                 
58  As maintained by the Appellate Body in the Australia–Salmon case, the risk assessed in the court 
should be a probable and not a possible one, for it must be ascertainable and verifiable and must 
allow for an objective risk assessment. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, 
Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon ¶ 123, WTO Doc No WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct 20, 
1998) (Australia–Salmon). 
59  This position is confirmed by the Appellate Body report in Japan–Apples, stating that the adjective 
“insufficient” attached to scientific evidence indicates a relational concept, as it is “adequate” for 
risk assessment. Report of the Appellate Body, Japan–Apples at ¶ 179 (cited in note 52). 
60  Id at ¶ 179 (emphasis added). 
61  Brian Wynne, Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority, in Roger Smith and Brian 
Wynne, eds, Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law 23, 44–45 (Routledge 1989). 
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B.  Legally Locked-In Scientific Evidence  
The previous paragraph has shown that the legal operation of linking the 
sufficiency of scientific evidence to the adequacy of risk assessment is not 
supported by a modern understanding of the epistemology of science.62 This 
flawed epistemology applies even less to the case of GMOs, where the 
supporting sciences of biology and ecology are by nature anything but complete, 
objective, or undisputed.63 
The dichotomy between science and precaution, between “sufficient 
scientific evidence” and “insufficient scientific evidence,” creates a serious legal 
problem. It is common knowledge that before a court (or a legal panel such as 
the WTO), the parties in dispute must provide some evidence in support of their 
case. Putting aside the question of allocating the burden of proof,64 the issue is 
establishing which obligations are relevant to proving a case of inconsistency. 
Indeed, determining whether Article 5.1 or Article 5.7 is the controlling 
provision affects the evidentiary burden of the parties. 
In case of litigation, the defendant must provide scientific explanation in 
support of its stricter protection policies under Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. Legally, this justification corresponds to providing scientific 
evidence of some threat to human or animal health or to the environment, 
which is meant to qualify a situation of “necessity” under Article 5.1. For cases 
where no evidence of risk is available—in other words, cases of insufficient 
scientific evidence—Article 5.7 considers another kind of justification, which is 
apparently “less scientific” because it is not supported by conclusive evidence, 
but only by “available pertinent information,” calling for “precaution” instead of 
strict necessity. 
These preliminary considerations already suggest that, even if the 
fundamental characteristic of legal evidence is reasonableness and rationality, the 
kind of science intended by the Panel (always sufficient, complete, and objective) 
is more apt, if not automatically apt, to provide evidence for a case than is 
precaution. Indeed, the kind of rationality behind the latter is much less evident 
and much more difficult to disclose before a court. In short, science, if 
conclusive and temporarily undisputed, creates a legal advantage for whomever 
wants to use it as evidence for his case and, conversely, imposes a huge burden 
                                                 
62  For further discussion on this point, see generally Elisa Vecchione, Science for the Environment: 
Examining the Allocation of the Burden of Uncertainty, 2 Eur J Risk Reg 227 (2011). 
63  Interview with Antoine Méssean, Head of Unit, Ecological Impacts of Innovations in Crop 
Production, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) France, in Paris, France (Apr 
16, 2008). 
64  Indeed, there is nothing to discuss, since legal procedure prescribes that it falls to the complainant 
to form a prima facie case of inconsistency between the defendant’s behavior and his obligations. 
See Section II. 
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on whomever wants to provide a case to the contrary.
65
 This is the characteristic 
of scientific knowledge per se and these are its legal implications when used in a 
tribunal. This situation risks automatically translating scientific standards of 
proof into legal standards of proof. If “science” means only complete scientific 
knowledge establishing cause-effects relationships in factual terms through risk 
assessment, then there could not be any competing legal evidence, much less any 
based on a case of “insufficient scientific evidence.” 
This risk explicitly materialized in the EC—Biotech case, which is why there 
would have been practically no difference if the Panel had maintained its own 
findings and reviewed the complainant’s case on the basis of Article 5.7 instead 
of Article 5.1.66 Indeed, if that had been the case, the complainants would have 
had to demonstrate that scientific evidence was not insufficient67 (in other words, 
that it was sufficient) and, as a second step, that evidence would have rationally 
called for a different (in other words, zero or less stringent) level of protection. 
If we retain the vision of science emerging from WTO jurisprudence and 
confirmed by the EC–Biotech Panel, we can conclude that this burden is relatively 
easy to discharge. Not only risk assessments but also international standards, 
such as the Codex Alimentarius,68 were in place in the case of EC–Biotech to 
demonstrate that scientific evidence was in fact sufficient. The burden of proof 
would have then shifted to the defendant, which would have had to prove that 
the scientific evidence was, on the contrary, insufficient. This proof requires 
disrupting already existing international standards or already available risk 
assessments by providing new scientific evidence. But this very condition means 
that the justification for precautionary actions is difficult to exercise. First, the 
evidence required is burdensome in scientific terms because it corresponds to a 
paradigm shift. Second, this condition relies on the requirement in Article 5.1, 
despite the fact that the case of precaution should instead be made on the basis 
                                                 
65  The science used for informing legal trials and instructing policy decisions—which are eventually 
contested within legal trials—is a form of knowledge that is “frozen,” contingent upon consensus 
of the majority of the scientific community. This means that it can be contested, but to do so 
imposes a heavy burden on whomever wants to confute the state of the art. 
66  See Section II.C. 
67  Specifically, as per the Appellate Body’s findings in the Japan–Agricultural Products case, compliance 
with Article 5.7 was to be determined upon four requirements. Measures shall be: (1) imposed in 
respect of a situation where “relevant scientific information is insufficient”; and (2) adopted “on 
the basis of available pertinent information.” Members shall (3) “seek the . . . measure accordingly 
within a reasonable period of time”; and (4) review the . . . measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time.” Thus, the complainants would have discharged their burden by simply 
demonstrating the inconsistency of EU measures with at least one of these requirements. See 
Report of the Appellate Body, Japan–Agricultural Products at ¶ 90 (cited in note 16). 
68  The Codex Alimentarius is one of the so-called “three sisters” organizations explicitly referred to 
by the SPS Agreement for providing international standards, guidelines, and recommendations. 
See SPS Agreement, Annex A, ¶ 3 (cited in note 12).  
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of Article 5.7—in other words, on the basis of “insufficient scientific evidence.” 
The trap in which the precautionary principle falls is clear: demonstrating 
“insufficient” scientific evidence through the provision of new, hence 
“sufficient,” scientific evidence. However, even without that, it is unlikely that 
already available scientific evidence (contained in international standards) will be 
countered by insufficient scientific evidence or “pertinent available 
information.”  
The vicious cycle of incessantly searching for scientific truth is caused by 
the strict dichotomy maintained between “sufficient science” as the only science 
and “insufficient science” as something else: less scientific, less evident. And 
indeed in the actual proceedings the Panel tried to evaluate, with the help of a 
scientific panel specially appointed for the case,69 whether the scientific studies 
conducted by the European states could account for new scientific evidence 
capable of counteracting previous science. As such, new scientific evidence 
should have been able to demonstrate the existence of a probable rather than 
just a possible risk.70 No matter how minimal the risk found, it had to be proven 
as a matter of fact. In other words, it had to be “ascertainable” in terms of a 
cause-effect relationship.71 But this position again dismisses the fact that a case 
of precaution originates from the exact opposite situation, which is the inability 
to prove a cause-effect relationship.  
                                                 
69  A scientific panel was established to distinguish science, truth, and certain information from 
everything else. However, the recourse to the scientific panel was more a procedural artifice than 
the expression of a true consciousness of the complexity of the science-law interface. Interview 
with Eric Schoonejans, Legal Counsel for the delegation of the European Communities to the 
EC–Biotech dispute, in Paris, France (Sept 1, 2008). The complexity and accuracy of this part of 
the report is both undeniable and useless to the purpose of legal proceedings. Moreover, the five 
scientists appointed to the scientific panel were definitely not enough to handle commentaries on 
more than forty GMOs. 
70  For instance, for the Austrian ban on T-25 maize, the probabilities of specific risks were not 
reported, just the possibility of risks generally. With respect to the potential adverse effects on 
human and animal safety, only reservations on risk assessment procedures were advanced, which 
did not persuasively counsel for the ban’s adequacy.  
71  The EC–Biotech panel maintained the Appellate Body findings in the Australian–Salmon case that, if 
Article 3.3 confers upon a member state the right to set the preferred level of protection, then 
each member state had, in principle, the right to ban a product even if the risk of dangerous 
effects from its usage was minimal: “As stated in our Report in European Communities – Hormones, 
the ‘risk’ evaluated in a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical uncertainty is 
‘not the kind of risk which, under Article 5.1, is to be assessed.’ This does not mean, however, 
that a Member cannot determine its own appropriate level of protection to be ‘zero risk.’” Report 
of the Appellate Body, Australian–Salmon at ¶ 125 (cited in note 58). 
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IV.  A  QUESTION OF RIGHTS :  HOW TO PROVIDE LEGAL 
EVIDENCE OF INSUFFICIENT SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE  
The previous Section demonstrates that the dichotomy between science 
and precaution translates into a dramatic overlap between scientific and legal 
standards of proof, the standard for both of which is risk assessment. As a 
consequence of the dichotomy between science and precaution, a perfect and 
dangerous conceptual match emerges between scientific evidence and legal 
evidence, while an oxymoron seems to dominate the relationship between 
uncertainty, in the form of insufficient scientific evidence, and legal evidence. How 
is it in fact possible to provide evidence of uncertainty?  
The consequence of such an approach is that precautionary measures 
cannot find any defense in case of dispute, simply because the legal issue of 
providing evidence of a case (in other words, a case of insufficient scientific 
evidence) is discarded as almost a contradictory operation. But if we suppose 
that the existence of a right (in other words, the right to set preferable levels of 
protection under Article 3.3) depends on the ability of the party invoking that 
right to demonstrate the legitimacy of its conduct, then we might wonder 
whether this right subsists for the case of precautionary measures.  
As in any international organization, within the WTO tension always exists 
between national states’ sovereignty and their international obligations. In the 
context of SPS measures, the WTO obligation to provide scientific justification 
for restrictive trade measures is a necessary coordination rule for a multilateral 
trade system in which each member state has in principle the right to choose its 
own level of protection. The risk is that SPS measures become a de facto 
“disguised restriction to international trade” and devolve into the right to 
undertake unilateral action. How can a balance be struck between this right and 
scientific obligations? 
There is no WTO jurisprudence on science-related disputes clearly defining 
this relationship. Until the EC–Biotech case, WTO jurisprudence had never 
defined it more than in terms of a unilateral relationship between science and 
policy, where science served as a pivot for national governments to fine-tune 
policies according to their degree of risk aversion.  
Indeed, the dichotomy between science and precaution makes the 
relationship between scientific analysis and policy decisions a unilateral one, 
where the former instructs the latter: Once the risk is set in probabilistic terms—
that is, once it has provided scientific justification—the legislator’s autonomous 
right to set the level of protection is reduced to its degree of aversion to this risk. 
In this sense, the legislator only has the autonomous right to be more or less risk 
averse, provided there is a risk, established through a cause-effect relationship, 
justifying its aversion. Therefore, in terms of the EC–Biotech case, it is clear that 
the examination of whether the EC measures were “based on” risk assessment 
could only be straightforwardly concluded with a negative finding once it was 
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determined that scientific evidence was sufficient: If the risk assessments already 
available showed no concern regarding GMOs, and if the studies provided by 
European states could not amount to scientific findings, the EC ban became 
“irrational” since it was based on no “objective” relationship72 with the results of 
risk assessments. 
V.  THE US–CONTINUED SUSPENSION  DISPUTE :  OPENING THE 
GATEWAY FOR A NEW EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE AT THE 
WTO 
Despite the fact that the relationship between scientific obligations and 
sovereign rights was dismissed in the EC–Biotech case, the question remains as to 
the margin of risk aversion allowed to the legislator to set higher standards of 
protection than those set by international organizations. 
Considering the ideal situation where science is conclusive and complete, 
we know that there would be no challenge to legitimately setting higher 
standards of protection. But once scientific evidence is provided, how high can 
the level of protection be? Or, put differently, if two member states adopt two 
different levels of protection based on the same scientific evidence, can both be 
judged to be “based on” risk assessment as required by Article 5.1? What is the 
maximum difference allowed between their degrees of risk aversion that would 
keep intact their right to set their own standards of protection?  
If the Panel’s view of science and precaution in the EC–Biotech case 
prevented any discussion on the relationship between the right to protect and 
the obligation to provide scientific justification, the US–Continued Suspension of 
Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute case of 2008 (US–Continued Suspension)73 
made important changes to this point.
74
 By dismantling the unilateral treatment 
of scientific assessment and policy measures for protection pursuant to Article 
5.1, the Appellate Body distanced itself from the mainstream view of science—
in other words, from the view that scientific conclusions must be complete and 
objective—that was initially adopted by the Panel. By reversing the most salient 
findings of the latter, the Appellate Body put forward the idea that on the one 
hand scientific conclusions may be multiple and equally legitimate, and, on the 
other, that they may be inconclusive but still legally relevant to corroborate a 
case of precaution. 
                                                 
72  See note 36. 
73  World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, US–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–
Hormones Dispute, WTO Doc Nos WT/DS320/R (US) and WT/DS321/R (Canada) (Mar 21, 
2008); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, US–Continued Suspension of 
Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute, WTO Doc No WT/DS320/AB/R (Sept 19, 2008). 
74  Report of the Panel, US–Continued Suspension at ¶¶ 7.609–7.611 (cited in note 73). 
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A.  The Factual Background of the Hormones Dispute  
The dispute between the EU and the group composed of the US and 
Canada on hormone-treated meat is long-standing. It dates back to 1996, when 
the US and Canada held formal consultations with the EU regarding the latter’s 
legislation covering the ban on six hormones for growth promoting purposes in 
livestock.75 The Appellate Body on the original Hormones case (EC–Hormones)76 
concluded by faulting the EU for maintaining a ban inconsistent with Article 5.1 
of the SPS Agreement. The EU failed to conduct a proper risk assessment that 
provided evidence of a specific risk from residues in meat treated with hormonal 
growth promoters.  
Later, since the EU failed to comply with the WTO decision on the dispute 
and did not lift its ban, the US and Canada, pursuant to Article 22.2 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding77 (DSU), adopted retaliatory measures against 
the EU in the form of 100 percent ad valorem duty on selected food products 
from European countries. The EU responded by commissioning seventeen new 
scientific studies to reaffirm its position that there were possible risks to human 
health associated with hormone-treated meat, given the available scientific data.  
In 2003, in conjunction with Directive 2003/74/EC, the EU notified the 
Dispute Settlement Body that it had brought its previously inconsistent 
measures into compliance. For the case of the hormone 17 beta-oestradiol, the 
requirements under Article 5.1 were met by establishing a clear and definite risk, 
whereas for the other five hormones in question, a temporary ban was invoked 
under Article 5.7. By virtue of these assessments, the EU asserted that it had 
fulfilled its WTO obligations and asked for the immediate lifting of the sanctions 
imposed by Canada and the US in accordance with the provisions of Article 22.8 
of the DSU. As the two countries refused to withdraw their retaliatory measures, 
a Panel was established in February 2005. 
Despite the fact that the US–Continued Suspension case was premised on the 
alleged infringement of certain provisions of the DSU, the current dispute 
settlement text lacks an explicit post-retaliation complaint procedure. This is why 
the Panel decided to base the proceedings not only on the DSU,
78
 but also on 
                                                 
75  Council Directive 96/22/EC prohibited administering to farm animals substances having a 
thyrostatic, oestrogenic, androgenic, or gestagenic action, as well as marketing meat from such 
animals. Council Directive 96/22/EC, 1996 OJ (L 125) 3, 3–8. The six hormones concerned are 
17 beta-oestradiol, progesterone, testosterone, zeranol, trenbolone, and melengestrol acetate. 
76  Report of the Appellate Body, EC–Hormones (cited in note 11).  
77  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol 1, Annex 2 A, 1869 UN Treaty Ser 441 (1994). 
78  The Panel held that the US and Canada had violated the DSU by maintaining their retaliatory 
measures rather than initiating WTO proceedings after the EU had notified the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the enactment of Directive 2003/74/EC. Report of the Panel, US–Continued 
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the provisions of the SPS Agreement to determine whether the EC had fully 
complied with the ruling in the EC–Hormones case.
79
 This decision, though 
highly disputable, makes the US–Continued Suspension case particularly instructive 
on the evolution of WTO jurisprudence for science-related disputes. 
Whereas the majority of the EC–Biotech case revolved around the 
relationship between Articles 5.1 and 5.7 in determining whether one took 
precedence over the other,80 in the US–Continued Suspension case, the provisions 
relevant to the dispute are clear, as are the procedures of the Panel to review the 
compliance of European studies on 17 beta-oestradiol with Article 5.1 on the 
one hand, and the compliance of the other studies covering the five remaining 
hormones with Article 5.7 on the other.81  
Using this distinction, two different questions were addressed by the US–
Continued Suspension Panel: Whether the scientific reviews on the hormone 17 
beta-oestradiol could account for risk assessment under Article 5.1; and whether, 
as regards the five remaining hormones temporarily banned based on 
precautionary considerations, “relevant scientific evidence can become insufficient 
within the meaning of Article 5.7 in the presence of international standards.”82 
Therefore, the EC had to demonstrate that previously accepted scientific studies 
had become outdated either due to new scientific evidence or to new findings 
raising concerns about the validity of their conclusions. In short, the EC needed 
to prove that scientific evidence had evolved since the 1998 Appellate Body 
decision, that it had overridden previous scientific examinations, and that it 
rationally supported new SPS measures.  
B.  How to Override Scientific Evidence  
Conceptually, overriding previous scientific evidence consists of two 
phases. The first is one of disruption, where doubts and concerns are raised for 
                                                                                                                              
Suspension at ¶ 7.245 (cited in note 73). See European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, Directive 2003/74/EC, 2003 OJ (L 262) 17. The Panel’s decision was then reversed by 
the Appellate Body. Report of the Appellate Body, US–Continued Suspension at ¶ 736 (cited in note 
73).  
79  It clearly emerges from the Panel report that the EC had done its utmost to avoid such a 
situation, probably based on the memory of similar disputes in the past, such as EC–Hormones in 
1998 and EC–Biotech in 2006, where friction was evident between the epistemology of science 
made by the SPS Agreement and its own doctrine on the precautionary principle. See generally 
Report of the Panel, US–Continued Suspension (cited in note 73). 
80  See Section III.B. 
81  Unlike the EC–Biotech case, where a dispute settlement panel was requested, in the US–Continued 
Suspension case the complainant (the EC) initiated compliance panel proceedings, where it was in 
its interest to prove (and determine the relevant provisions for its case) that the respondent failed 
to bring itself into compliance with WTO obligations. Report of the Panel, US–Continued 
Suspension at ¶ 4.32 (cited in note 73). 
82  Id at ¶ 7.619 (emphasis added). 
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different reasons, such as the scientific approach, methodologies, disciplines 
included, objective of the study, and so on. The second is one of counter-evidence, 
where the scientific void is replaced by new concluding evidence, confirming the 
errors, incompleteness, and inconclusiveness of previous scientific studies. In 
the EC–Biotech case, we saw that the Panel was concerned only with new 
scientific evidence despite the fact that the case for the GMO ban had been built 
upon precautionary justifications: It bypassed the first stage and asked only for 
counter-evidence. But in the US–Continued Suspension case, the two phases were 
kept separate for the first time according to whether the parties based their case 
upon Article 5.1 or 5.7. Indeed, the question emerged in clear terms whether the 
occurrence of the first stage alone, that of disruption, is sufficient to provide 
legal evidence for a case of insufficient scientific evidence. 
1. Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement: The appropriateness of risk 
assessment. 
In examining whether the new European studies accounted for scientific 
evidence, the Panel sought to determine “whether scientific evidence supported 
the conclusions in the Opinions provided by the EU.”83 The reason for putting 
the question of sufficient scientific evidence in those terms is that, with the 
favorable presumption that European analysis amounted to a risk assessment, 
the situation was, unlike in the EC–Biotech case, one of competing risk 
assessments (that of the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives and other 
“old” safety assessments,84 and that of the EU), that were both supposedly 
conclusive. Therefore, the Panel went on to determine whether the new risk 
assessment provided by the EU could directly challenge the old ones through 
scientific counter-evidence. 
The procedure consisted of a legal examination of whether the EU risk 
assessment was “appropriate to the circumstances” as prescribed by Article 5.1,85 
which actually translated into testing whether the transformation of the input 
(scientific evidence) into an output (conclusions) occurred in the right way. The 
Panel appointed a scientific panel to determine whether it would have been 
rational to achieve certain results starting from certain elements. The approach 
was exactly the same as in the EC–Biotech case. The Panel maintained that the 
                                                 
83  Id at ¶ 7.552. 
84  The US’s position was based on different safety assessments of national and international origin, 
such as those of the US Food and Drug Administration, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
and the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives. Id at ¶ 4.85. 
85  The Panel agreed with the reasoning of the Panel in Japan–Apples that “the scientific evidence 
which is being evaluated must support the conclusions of the [risk assessment]. Therefore, if the 
conclusions of the risk assessment are not sufficiently supported by the scientific evidence 
referred to in the [risk assessment], then there cannot be a risk assessment appropriate to the 
circumstances, within the meaning of Article 5.1.” Report of the Panel, US–Continued Suspension at 
¶ 7.538 (cited in note 73). 
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relationship between the adequacy of risk assessment and the sufficiency of 
scientific evidence is a matter of procedural and linear evolution from empirical 
evidence to theoretical probabilities. In this view, scientific controversies cannot 
exist or should be easily settled. Given this view, it is not surprising that the 
same overlap between scientific standards of evidence and legal standards of 
evidence occurred as had occurred in the EC–Biotech case. Indeed, in its attempt 
to obtain objective information from scientific experts, the Panel finally translated 
the supposed objectivity of science from laboratories to the courtroom and 
concluded that the EC ban on 17 beta-oestradiol was not based on a risk 
assessment “appropriate to the circumstances.”86 
The simplicity of the Panel’s interpretation of Article 5.1 was sharply 
overturned by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body confirmed the 
drawbacks of searching for an objective science that sheds light on legal 
argumentation and decisions. The Appellate Body commented on the Panel’s 
decision to consult scientific experts, saying that “the review power of a panel is 
not to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a WTO Member is 
correct, but rather to determine whether that risk assessment is supported by 
coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, 
objectively justifiable.”87 In this sense, it continued, “a panel should review whether 
the particular conclusions drawn by the Member assessing the risk find sufficient support 
in the scientific evidence relied upon.”88 Hence, the appropriateness of risk 
assessment should not be judged on objectivity, but on the coherence of its 
reasoning and the rigor of its scientific methodologies, which refer to a legal 
operation rather than to legal faith in scientific advocacy. Given this 
interpretation, the Appellate Body overturned the Panel’s previous findings and 
concluded that the European study on 17 beta-oestradiol amounted to a risk 
assessment.89 
2. Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement: How to provide legal evidence 
of insufficient scientific evidence. 
The question of whether the temporary ban imposed by the EC on five 
hormones was justifiable because of “insufficient scientific evidence” pursuant 
to Article 5.7 was, as expected, a harbinger of controversy.  
We saw that the EC–Biotech dispute clearly revealed the difficulty of 
justifying SPS measures according to the precautionary principle. And, indeed, to 
provide legal evidence of insufficient scientific evidence seems almost a 
                                                 
86  Id at ¶ 7.573. 
87  Report of the Appellate Body, US–Continued Suspension at ¶ 590 (cited in note 73) (emphasis 
added). 
88  Id at ¶ 591 (emphasis added). 
89  Id at ¶ 619. 
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contradictory process, all the more so when it involves disrupting previously 
accepted scientific knowledge. This is also true in the US–Continued Suspension 
case, in which numerous studies and reports from international scientific 
organizations responsible for food quality standards90 had raised no concerns 
until then about the hormones in question used as growth-promoting agents in 
livestock. 
The core question of the proceedings as set by the Panel was to what 
extent “relevant scientific evidence can become insufficient within the meaning of 
Article 5.7 in the presence of international standards.”91 First, the Panel revised 
the meaning of “insufficient scientific evidence,” confirming previous 
jurisprudence that the qualification of insufficient was to be given with respect 
to the capability of performing risk assessment.92 Specifically, insufficient 
scientific evidence was to be judged retrospectively on the adequacy of the risk 
assessment. The Panel held that a risk assessment was adequate when it was 
complete and had established a cause-effect relationship between an event and 
an outcome in terms of risk.93 If the risk assessment was not adequate, then 
scientific evidence should have been found insufficient to fully reveal “the 
potential for the identified adverse effects.”94 
Decisions in previous science-related trade disputes have never before 
stated that precautionary measures are justified in cases where risk assessment 
fails to establish a cause-effect relationship. In addition to its novelty, this 
interpretation is the closest to the most common international formula of the 
precautionary principle: the lack of full evidence of cause-effect relationships on 
the one hand, and the requirement to provide some tentative scientific 
explanation of the possibility of a severe risk on the other, are indeed the most 
important tenets of the principle.95 Therefore, the question turned out to be 
whether the impossibility of concluding on the evidence of a risk raised by the 
European inquiries could be retained as legal proof that international scientific 
standards had become outdated. What would have made previous cause-effect 
relationships unsustainable?  
                                                 
90  See note 84. 
91  Report of the Panel, US–Continued Suspension at ¶ 7.597 (cited in note 73) (emphasis added). 
92  The Panel held the Appellate Body’s interpretation in the Japan–Apples case that “‘relevant 
scientific evidence’ will be ‘insufficient’ within the meaning of Article 5.7 if the body of available 
scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the performance of an 
adequate assessment of risks as required under Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A to the SPS 
Agreement.” Id at ¶ 7.598. See note 52.  
93  Report of the Panel, US–Continued Suspension at ¶ 7.507 (cited in note 73). 
94  Id at ¶ 7.628. 
95  See generally David Freestone and Ellen Hey, Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Challenges and 
Opportunities, in Freestone and Hey, eds, The Precautionary Principle and International Law 249 (cited in 
note 6).  
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According to the Panel’s interpretation, the complainant should have 
shown “a critical mass of new evidence and/or information that calls into 
question the fundamental precepts of previous knowledge” contained in 
international standards.
96
 But a critical mass, as later recognized by the Appellate 
Body, represents a paradigm shift in the scientific community. In other words, it 
is a requirement to provide something close to sufficient scientific evidence, 
which again confirms the presence of a locked-in situation where precautionary 
measures are finally justified upon grounds of scientific conclusiveness instead 
of scientific uncertainty.  
When the EC appealed to the Appellate Body and raised this very concern, 
the Panel’s interpretation was overturned. In the Appellate Body’s words: 
Limiting the application of Article 5.7 to situations where scientific advances 
lead to a paradigm shift would be too inflexible an approach. WTO 
Members should be permitted to take a provisional measure where new 
evidence from a qualified and respected source puts into question the 
relationship between the pre-existing body of scientific evidence and the 
conclusions regarding the risks. We are referring to circumstances where 
new scientific evidence casts doubts as to whether the previously existing body 
of scientific evidence still permits of a sufficiently objective assessment of 
risk.97 
In this sense, the Appellate Body implicitly acknowledged the existence of two 
phases in scientific research, one of disruption and one of counter-evidence.98 
Even if not conclusive, the former has the potential to provide some evidence, 
scientific and then legal, of a threat, which means the results of previous 
scientific analysis are now outdated and no longer reliable. 
C. Questions Left Open 
The findings of the Appellate Body Report on the US–Continuous Suspension 
case paved the way for a new epistemology of science at the WTO. 
First, with respect to Article 5.1, the Appellate Body destabilized the 
unilateral relationship between scientific evidence and legal evidence by 
specifying that the scientific “objectivity” pursued in laboratories translates into 
the search for “coherence” in the courtroom. Therefore, it implicitly 
acknowledged that there is no unique rationality between processing scientific 
data and drawing conclusions about the process. The legitimacy of scientific 
interpretations is tested according to their coherence. Second, once the 
separation between legal and scientific standards of evidence has been 
determined, the Appellate Body broke the coterminous application of sufficient 
                                                 
96  Report of the Panel, US–Continued Suspension at ¶ 7.648 (cited in note 73). 
97  Report of the Appellate Body, US–Continued Suspension at ¶ 703 (cited in note 73) (emphasis 
added). 
98  See Section V.B. 
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scientific evidence and sufficient legal evidence and, conversely, between 
insufficient scientific evidence and insufficient legal evidence. 
Without these two fundamental changes in the epistemology of science, the 
issue of providing legal evidence for a case of insufficient scientific evidence 
would have never been raised as relevant for the application of the precautionary 
principle within the WTO legal framework; the issue would have persisted in the 
form of providing sufficient scientific evidence, with no distinction between the 
legal and scientific nature of the two standards of proof. 
Despite the fact that the Appellate Body deserves credit for setting a new 
precedent on the relationship between science and law, it did not conclude 
whether the EU measures were based on scientific risk assessment under Article 
5.1, on the one hand, or were justified under conditions of insufficient scientific 
evidence under Article 5.7, on the other. This is due to the nature of the appeals, 
which are supposed to re-interpret points of law contained in the Panel’s final 
decisions and not to re-examine existing evidence or to examine new evidence. 
Some fundamental questions were then left open. Should the EU have 
opted for a different level of protection? After having found that the European 
study on 17 beta-oestradiol amounted to a risk assessment—in other words, that 
scientific evidence was legally sufficient under Article 5.1—the Appellate Body 
concluded that it was not in a position to determine whether the conclusions of 
the scientific studies were objectively “based on” the ensuing policy measures, 
and recommended that the parties initiate new proceedings on the issue.
99
 
Therefore, the Appellate Body left open the question of the relation between the 
standard of evidence and the degree of risk aversion. Once science indicates the 
probability or the possibility of a risk, what is the maximum degree of risk 
aversion that would be allowed to governments legitimately to maintain their 
right to protect human, animal, and environmental health?
100
  
Concerning the five other hormones for which the EC invoked the 
precautionary principle, the Appellate Body failed to determine whether the 
doubts raised by European studies were enough to form legal proof of 
insufficient scientific evidence. It follows that the Appellate Body did not even 
reach the question of whether the corresponding policy measures—in this case, 
a temporary ban—were consistent with the available scientific evidence, even if 
insufficient. 
                                                 
99  Report of the Appellate Body, US–Continued Suspension at ¶ 620 (cited in note 73). 
100  It may be presumed that the issue is addressed in terms of proportionality between restrictive 
measures to trade and scientific evidence, whether sufficient or insufficient. The principle of 
proportionality, indeed, is not new in cases of scientific warnings. As it is founded on the 
principles of a common and integrated market, the EU knows this principle well, and it is also 
included in its doctrine on the precautionary principle. See Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle COM (2000) 1 final at 
4. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION  
This Article has tried to elucidate some fundamental features of the WTO’s 
legal approach to science-related controversies in order to outline a specific 
epistemological framework. The purpose of this operation is to determine a 
precise application of the precautionary principle within the WTO legal 
framework in order to test whether its applicability is ever admissible. 
The EC–Biotech dispute is instructive in this sense. It confirms that the only 
way to bring evidence of a risk before a WTO panel is by demonstrating it in 
factual terms, which is equivalent not only to performing a risk assessment, but 
most importantly to performing an “adequate” risk assessment capable of 
concluding that a risk exists in the form of a cause-effect relationship. 
Given this situation, the European defense based on the precautionary 
principle was annulled, for two reasons: first, because providing evidence of a 
case of “insufficient scientific evidence” is anything but an easy legal operation, 
whereas providing evidence of “sufficient scientific evidence” through a risk 
assessment seems almost automatic; second, because the (non-)evidence of 
“insufficient scientific evidence” should have counteracted the evidence 
provided by those risk assessments that had already been performed on certain 
GMOs. 
This situation, which this Article has denounced, corresponded de facto to 
overlapping scientific and legal standards of proof, where the only legal evidence 
was that of science, or “sufficient scientific evidence.” 
If this overlap has prevented any application of the precautionary principle 
in the WTO legal framework, it also called into question the autonomous right 
of WTO member states to set their chosen levels of protection. Indeed, if this 
right can only be maintained when there is hard evidence provided by conclusive 
scientific findings, it certainly cannot be sustained through precautionary 
considerations. But even without that, the WTO jurisprudence fails to uncover 
another important question: Considering an ideal situation where science can 
always provide justification for protection measures, how dissimilar can the 
levels of protection chosen by two member states be, given the same science?  
This question has never been addressed in WTO disputes because the 
relationship between the obligation to provide scientific justification and the 
right to choose among policy measures has never been developed in more than 
unilateral terms, where the only right for member states was to fine-tune their 
degree of risk-aversion to the risk in question.  
The open and unresolved questions that the EC–Biotech case raised 
reemerged in different forms in the US–Continued Suspension case. After the US–
Continued Suspension Panel’s decision confirmed the same approach as in the EC–
Biotech dispute, the Appellate Body’s findings paved the way for a new 
epistemology of science at the WTO. It broke the unequivocal relationship 
between objective science and objective policy by denouncing the gravity of 
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testing the adequacy of risk assessment in terms of its capability to provide one 
objective result. Therefore, the Appellate Body not only admitted that different 
legitimate interpretations of data analysis could exist, but it also sanctioned the 
separation between the legal and the scientific search for evidence.  
This separation occurred in the case of “sufficient scientific evidence,” but 
it opened up the opportunity to discuss whether it is ever possible also to 
provide legal evidence of “insufficient scientific evidence.” The Appellate Body’s 
decision defined precaution as a case where new scientific evidence, even if 
insufficient because inconclusive, casts doubt on previous scientific assessments 
so as to invalidate their conclusions. 
The Appellate Body’s findings on the US–Continued Suspension case make it 
possible to overcome the contested dichotomy between science and precaution, 
opening up a way to apply the precautionary principle within the WTO legal 
framework. However, the question remains open as to the relationship between 
the right of member states to set their own appropriate standards of protection 
and the obligation to maintain these according to scientific principles. Indeed, 
once it had been determined that scientific obligations had been fulfilled to 
provide a case of “sufficient scientific evidence,” the Appellate Body could not 
conclude whether the EU policy actions (the ban on 17 beta-oestradiol) 
rationally corresponded to this scientific evidence, nor, for the case of 
“insufficient scientific evidence” concerning the other hormones under 
examination, did it conclude on whether the amount of doubt cast by European 
studies actually invalidated previous scientific analysis on the safety of those 
hormones. Therefore, despite the fact that the Appellate Body on US–Continued 
Suspension deserves credit for advancing a far more complex view of science that 
re-established the autonomy of legal proceedings concerning any case of science, 
whether conclusive or inconclusive, the complexity raised by the sub-case of 
precaution nevertheless marked the limitations of science as a neutral arbiter for 
dispute settlement. 
